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CONFOUNDING THE PARADIGM: ASIAN AMERICANS
AND RACE PREFERENCES
LANCE T. Izumi*
INTRODUCTION
For supporters of government race-preference programs,
there has been an almost irresistible urge to paint opponents of
race preferences as acting not on principle, but on base opportu-
nism. For example, California Governor Pete Wilson's opposi-
tion to race preferences is frequently cited as owing more to
politics than to firmly held belief.1 And anti-preference African
Americans, such as University of California Regent Ward Con-
nerly, have been accused of trying to curry favor with Wilson and
other powerful anti-preference officials.2 Yet, impugning the
motivations of race-preference opponents cannot extinguish the
fact that real injuries have resulted from government race-prefer-
ence programs. These injuries have been felt by others besides
white males. Indeed, in many cases Asian Americans, more than
white males, have been the primary victims of government race-
preference schemes.
Oddly, however, Asian-American civil rights advocates have
attempted to ignore or belittle the negative impact of such
schemes on Asian Americans. For example, Dennis Hayashi,
Director of the Office of Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, has said:
[M] easuring the value of affirmative action solely by exam-
ining who benefits from a defined zero-sum game is short-
sighted. Affirmative action's value is tied not just to an
individual job or educational slot, but to the overall health
and stability of a corporation, business, campus, or society
* Lance T. Izumi is Senior Fellow in California Studies at the Pacific
Research Institute for Public Policy. Previously, Mr. Izumi was director of
writing and research for California Governor George Deukmejian. He also
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Southern California, his MA. in political science from the University of
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California at Los Angeles.
1. Corinne Maekawa Kodama, Broadening the Scope of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 6 AsIAN Am. POL'Y REv. 62 (1996).
2. Id.
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and to an acknowledgment that discrimination remains an
ongoing problem.'
In other words, even if individual Asian Americans are hurt by
government race-preference programs (the "zero-sum game"),
Asian Americans should look beyond individual injuries caused
by race preferences to the greater good that race preferences
supposedly promote. Asian Americans, thus, are the odd men
out in a race paradigm that still essentially focuses on a black-
white dichotomy.
In this article, I will explore the Asian-American experience
with race-preference programs in California. In this exploration,
I will examine the empirical research concerning admissions to
the University of California's medical schools, the implications of
this data with regard to constitutional principles, and the Asian-
American experience which confounds the conventional black-
white paradigm of race preferences. In those few cases where
Asian Americans are assisted by race-preference programs, I will
argue that Asian Americans cannot have it both ways: they cannot
oppose race preferences when they are injured by them and sup-
port preferences when they are benefited by them.
THE EVOLUTION OF AFnmMATIVE ACTION
Today's web of government race-preference programs is a
departure from America's historical response to discrimination
against minority groups. Previously, discriminatory practices
were simply eliminated. For example, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution eliminated the government-protected
institution of slavery.4 When state governments interfered with
the right of minority citizens to vote, the Fifteenth Amendment
was passed to ensure that government did not abridge that
right.5
Starting in the 1970s, however, this focus on eliminating dis-
criminatory practices shifted. Interestingly, it was the Nixon
administration that made the initial attempt to implement
affirmative action policies that gave preferences to certain so-
called "under-represented" minority groups.6 All levels of gov-
ernment eventually followed the federal lead.
3. Dennis Hayashi & Christopher Edley, Jr., The Presidentia ReAiew of
Affiimative Action: A Vww fivm the Insid, 6 AsiAN Am. POLY REv. 40 (1996).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
6. See Paul Craig Roberts & Lawrence M. Stratton, Proliferation of Priviege,
NAT'L REv., Nov. 6, 1995, at 41.
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UNINTENDED VICTIMS
Although only privileged white males were meant to be
inconvenienced by the new policy, a new class of victims was
unintentionally created: the non-under-represented minorities.
These latter minorities, which included Asian Americans, per-
formed well on objective indicators such as standardized tests.
Because of their relatively high performance, the number of
Asian Americans in selection pools for university admission and
certain government employment was also relatively high. As a
result, Asian Americans were often not included in race-prefer-
ence programs meant to benefit those racial minorities with low
numbers in selection pools.7
Although bureaucratic defenders of race preferences, like
Mr. Hayashi, may argue that individuals must sacrifice their own
interests for the greater good, such an argument is hard to sus-
tain when one looks at exactly who is being asked to make such
sacrifices. For example, every year in Sacramento, California, the
local Vietnamese-American community sponsors a popular event
that honors young Vietnamese-American students who have
earned top grades in school. The comments of these students,
many of whom are either immigrants themselves or are the sons
and daughters of recent immigrants, demonstrate that, despite
the cynical nature of the age in which we live, the time-honored
notion of the American Dream (which is based on equality of
opportunity and individual initiative) is far from dead.
Hien Vu, a student at Hiram Johnson High School,
described the way in which he met the challenges posed by his
new homeland:
When I first came to this country three years ago, people
made fun of me-they said I was stupid because I couldn't
speak English well--so I made a commitment that I'd get
ahead of them. Most of the people who risk their life to
come here for freedom try harder.8
7. According to University of California Regent Stephen Nakashima, only
5% of all African-American high school graduates and 4% of Hispanic
graduates met the minimum eligibility requirements for UC admission in 1994-
95, versus 35% of Asian Americans and 12.5% of whites. In order to increase
African-American and Hispanic admissions, eligibility standards were lowered
for these groups. This policy, according to Regent Nakashima, forced "Asians
and white males to overcome the burdens of a tilted field." See S. Stephen
Nakashima, UC Regent Nakashima: "Get Undeprseued Minorities to Playing Feid
Before Co!eg, " RAmu SI-mpo, July 28, 1995, at 3.
8. Steve Magagnini, Vietnamese-American Kids Honored for Good Grades,
SAcaAMErNo BEE, Aug. 6, 1995, at B1.
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Vu, who now has a 3.7 grade-point average, observed with satis-
faction, "Now the other kids don't tease me."9
Sally Nguyen, who graduated from Florin High School with
an A-plus grade-point average and who plans to study pre-med at
UC San Diego, noted the rigor of her normal routine saying,
"From 5 to 8 p.m. we'd do homework together. Every single
night my dad would not only make me do my homework but
help me correct it. I don't see that a lot with my American
friends."l ° In all, the Sacramento Vietnamese-American commu-
nity in 1995 honored 110 students with grade-point averages of
4.0 or better.'"
Unfortunately, until the University of California Board of
Regents recently eliminated race preferences in the university
system's admissions process, 12 many of these high-achieving
Vietnamese-American students would have found that their com-
mon-sensical view that hard work and good results are rewarded
was incorrect Indeed, the UC Board of Regents banned race-
preferential admissions policies in large part because of the
undeniable evidence that individuals of Asian descent were hurt
by the UC's race-preference policies."3
Using admissions data from the UC Office of the President,
a study conducted by the Pacific Research Institute for Public
Policy (PRI) found that race-based preferences in admissions pol-
icy did indeed assist under-represented minorities such as Afri-
can Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native Americans.
Those injured by the policy, however, included notjust members
of the white majority, but also, and especially, Asian Americans. 4
For example, in 1993, the UC Davis School of Medicine
accepted African Americans at thirteen times the rate of Japa-
nese Americans (28 out of 243 African-American applicants were
accepted, but only 1 out of 90 Japanese-American applicants was
accepted).' 5 Native Americans were accepted at five times the
rate of Chinese Americans, and Mexican Americans were
accepted at nearly fourteen times the rate of Korean Ameri-
9. Id.
10. Id. at B6.
11. Id.
12. The Regents voted to eliminate race preferences in admissions and
contracting at their July 20, 1995 meeting. For comments made by UC Regent
Stephen Nakashima immediately after the meeting, see UC Regent Explains Vote,
RAyu SHIMPO, July 25, 1995, at 1.
13. Nakashima, supra note 7, at 3.
14. Michael Lynch, Race-Based Admissions at University of Califomia Medical
SchooLs, PAC. RES. INsr. FOR PUB. POL'Y BImEING, June 1995.
15. Id. at 8.
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cans.16 The comparison between Mexican Americans and
Korean Americans is especially interesting because UC Davis had
virtually the same number of applicants from each ethnic
group-235 Mexican Americans and 241 Korean Americans-yet
40 Mexican Americans were accepted while only 3 Korean Ameri-
cans were accepted. 17 Although UC Davis contended that it gave
no special preferences based upon race and ethnicity, the
probability that this many under-represented minorities could be
randomly accepted to the medical school over a two-year period
was less than one in a million."
Sizable disparities were also found at the other UC medical
schools. At the UC San Francisco School of Medicine, African
Americans were admitted at 3.2 times the rate of Asian Ameri-
cans. 9 At the UC Irvine School of Medicine, Mexican Americans
were admitted at 3.1 times the rate of Vietnamese Americans.20
At most of the UC medical schools, applicants from under-repre-
sented minority groups were awarded 20-30% of the admissions,
although they made up only 9-10% of the applicant pool. 2'
Some race-preference supporters have tried to discount
these figures by arguing that one cannot accurately compare the
acceptance rates of various racial and ethnic groups because the
members of these groups attended different undergraduate insti-
tutions. To address this consideration, part of the PRI study
looked at those applicants who had received their undergraduate
degrees at UC Irvine in 1993. Among these UC Irvine graduates,
applicants from under-represented minority groups were nearly
three times more likely to be accepted to a UC medical school
than Vietnamese-American applicants who, as a group, had a
GPA of 3.8, the highest of any group.' In fact, the mean grade-
point average of two-thirds of the Vietnamese-American appli-
cants who were denied admission was higher than the mean
grade-point average of the under-represented minority appli-
cants who were admitted.23
Furthermore, the race of the applicants to UC schools
seemed to matter much more than their disadvantaged eco-
nomic status. UC Regent Ward Connerly, who authored the res-
olution that eliminated race preferences in UC admissions, has
16. Id.
17. Id. at app. 2.
18. Id. at 8.
19. I& at 12.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id. at 8-12.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id.
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noted that under-represented minorities "who score very low in
academic achievement but who are from relatively affluent fami-
lies get boosted towards the front of the line on race alone."24
Conversely, says Mr. Connerly, "Asians and whites who score in
the top levels on academics and who are from relatively poor
families are dropped way down the admissions line based solely
on race."2
The numbers in the PRI study support Regent Connerly's
assertion. In the UC Irvine graduate pool examined in the PRI
study, non-poor applicants from under-represented minority
groups were admitted at four times the rate of poor Vietnamese-
American applicants (9 out of 37 non-poor under-represented
minorities were admitted, but only 3 out of 49 Vietnamese-Ameri-
can applicants who were poor received admission),.2 In other
words, the son or daughter of a wealthy African-American busi-
nessman would have a much better chance of getting into a UC
medical school than the son or daughter of an impoverished
Vietnamese boat refugee.
ADARAm AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
Not only do the statistics cited above offend one's inherent
sense of fairness, they also violate constitutional principle. In the
landmark Adarand case, 7 the U.S. Supreme Court effectively
struck down a U.S. Department of Transportation requirement
that federal highway contracts contain financial incentives for
the principal contractor to hire minority subcontractors.
Adarand Constructors, Inc., a non-minority subcontractor, sub-
mitted the lowest bid for a guardrail contract, but lost the con-
tract to a minority-owned construction business. Although the
minority-owned business had submitted the higher bid, it was
awarded the guardrail contract because of the financial incentive
program. Adarand filed suit alleging a violation of its equal pro-
tection rights under the Fifth Amendment.2"
Although the facts of Adarand involved race preferences in
government contracts, the majority opinion was clearly directed
at all race-based classification schemes instituted by any govern-
ment body: "Accordingly, we hold today that all racial classifica-
tions, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
24. Black U C. Regent Scores Liberal Racism, HuMAN EvENTs, Aug. 4, 1995, at
3.
25. Id.
26. Lynch, supra note 14, at 16.
27. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
28. Id. at 2101.
CONFOUNDING THE PARADIGM
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny. "29 In overruling its own previous reasoning in Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC,0 the Supreme Court in Adarand stated:
[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion protect persons, not groups. It follows from that princi-
ple that all governmental action based on race-a group
classification long recognized as 'in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited'-should be subjected
to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right
to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.31
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, says that holding sup-
posedly "benign" state and federal racial classifications to a differ-
ent standard would violate this long-held view of equal
protection. 2 Thus, only a compelling state interest could justify
such a classification scheme.
The Court's explicit statement that the Constitution protects
persons, not groups, directly contradicts Mr. Hayashi's (and by
implication, the Clinton administration's) contention that the
greater good outweighs individual rights. The Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments were designed precisely to prevent govern-
ment's notion of the greater good from depriving individuals of
their right to equal protection of the laws. Under the Constitu-
tion, it is the constitutional rights of the individual, not the stabil-
ity of a corporation, business, campus, or society, that are
paramount.
The Court's emphasis that even supposedly "benign" racial
classifications be held up to strict scrutiny is also critical. The
arguments of race-preference supporters are often laced with ref-
erences to the noble motivations of the program. For example,
Kent Wong, president of the Asian Pacific American Labor Alli-
ance, AFL-CIO, has noted that:
In some instances, affirmative action guidelines have
required a diverse pool of applicants or have set forth hir-
ing and promotional guidelines that would help to achieve
racial and gender equity. Affirmative action has also raised
awareness and greater sensitivity among decision makers
29. Id. at 2113.
30. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding
"benign" racial classifications to only an intermediate level of scrutiny).
31. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
32. Id. at 2113.
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who have become more responsive to diversity in the
workplace 33
While it may be commendable that race-preference programs
raise people's sensitivities, such beneficial side effects cannot be
allowed to obscure the fact that the main effect of such programs
is to cause harm to specific individuals solely because they are
members of a disfavored race. Justice Powell, in his Bakke opin-
ion,' observed that, "despite the surface appeal of holding
'benign' racial classifications to a lower standard,. . . it may not
always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign."
Justice Thomas recognized this point in his concurring opinion
in Adarandk
It should be obvious that every racial classification helps, in
a narrow sense, some races and hurts others. As to the
races benefitted, the classification could surely be called
"benign." Accordingly, whether a law relying on racial tax-
onomy is "benign" or "malign," either turns on "whose ox
is [being] gored .... '
Given the adverse impact that race-preferential admissions
has had on Asian Americans, it is hard to imagine, for example,
that the high-achieving Sacramento Vietnamese-American stu-
dents mentioned earlier view race preferences as "benign." UC
Regent Stephen Nakashima, a Japanese American who voted to
eliminate UC's race-preference policies, illustrated this point by
analogizing race preferences to the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II:
What it was depended on how you looked at it. From the
outside looking into Poston III, where I was, it's an intern-
ment camp. But if you're inside behind barbed wire and
armed guards looking out, it's a concentration camp. The
same goes with respect to affirmative action. It depends on
how it affects you personally.3 7
For Asian-American students denied entry into a public uni-
versity's medical school because of race-preference admissions
policies favoring lower achieving under-represented minorities,
33. Kent Wong, Why Asian American Workers Support Affirmative Action, 6
AsIAN AM. POL'Y REV. 84 (1996).
34. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of
Powel, J.).
35. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995)
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
36. Id. at 2120 (quoting Bakke 438 U.S. at 295 n.35).
37. J.K. Yamamoto, JACL Hears Both Sides of Affirmative Action Debat,
HoKuam MAImcHI, Aug. 31, 1995, at 2.
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such a violation of their equal protection rights cannot be out-
weighed by amorphous claims of group benefits (e.g., increasing
diversity or raising people's sensitivities). On that score, the Con-
stitution's equal protection guarantees are clear. As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed in Hopwood v.
Texas: s
Within the general principles of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher
education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of
equal protection. Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes,
the use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than
as individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just
as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus
fueling racial hostility.39
And it is as individuals that the Hien Vus and Sally Nguyens of
this world wish to be judged.
HIsToRIcAL DISCIUMINATION
If the Constitution cannot countenance violation of equal
protection rights of individuals in the name of government's con-
ception of diversity and the greater good, it also cannot counte-
nance such a violation in the name of general claims of historical
discrimination. Justice Ginsburg, in her Adarand dissent, argued
that race preferences were needed to "counteract discrimina-
tion's lingering effects":'
Those effects, reflective of a system of racial caste only
recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, markets,
and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes,
qualifications, and interview styles still experience different
receptions, depending on their race. White and African-
American consumers still encounter different deals.41
Justice Ginsburg's observation and her citation of studies
and reports comparing differential treatment of whites versus
blacks42 postulates a simplistic two-race white-black paradigm.
38. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denie/ 115 S. Ct.
2581 (1996).
39. Id. at 945.
40. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Justice Ginsburg cites several studies including Ian Ayres, Fair Driving:
Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HAV. L. REv. 817
(1991), and Stephen L. Carter, When Vwtims Happen To Be Black 97 YALE L. REX'.
420 (1988), which mostly focus on treatment of blacks versus whites. See
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Under this paradigm, it is assumed that individual whites must
endure injury to pay their race's debt to African Americans for
the history of slavery and racial discrimination.
Yet, when race-preference programs injure Asian Americans,
the paradigm collapses. When the son or daughter of an impov-
erished Vietnamese refugee is denied entrance into a prestigious
public university merely because he or she is not a member of a
preferred racial or ethnic group, how is this harm justified by
appeals to historical discrimination or "lingering effects?" In
many cases, the Vietnamese-American student is much less
socially advantaged than the middle-class or upper-middle-class
African American who is frequently the beneficiary of race pref-
erences. Furthermore, Asian Americans have been the victims of
historical discrimination. The explicit anti-Asian laws passed in
the early part of this century and the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II are just two obvious examples.4
Asian Americans have also been increasingly common victims of
racial hate crimes (an indication of a more hostile social environ-
ment). Thus, it is hypocritical to say that historical discrimina-
tion can be a justification for preferences for one race, but not
another.
Asian-American supporters of race preferences often decry
the "invisibility" of Asian Americans in the affirmative action
debate." Yet, the black-white paradigm used by race-preference
supporters consigns Asian Americans to "invisible" status. By
ignoring Asian Americans, this paradigm also ignores the impor-
tant lessons that can be learned from the Asian-American experi-
ence. In his testimony to the UC Board of Regents supporting
the elimination of race preferences, Assemblyman Nao Takasugi,
for years the only Asian-American member of the California state
legislature, said that the principle underlying the anti-Asian dis-
crimination of yesteryear and the race discrimination of today is
the same:
During the internment, I saw families torn apart, ruined
and deprived of their rights as Americans. Let us be clear,
what we are discussing today with UC's special preferential
admissions policy is nothing more or nothing less than
43. Anti-Asian laws in the U.S. included: an 1854 law that prevented
Asians from testifying against white men; the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act that
restricted Asian immigration into the U.S.; the 1908 Gentleman's Agreement
that restricted Japanese immigration into the U.S.; and the 1913 Alien Land Act
that prevented Asians from owning land in California. For a discussion of these
laws, see THOMAS SoWELL, ETHNic AMEIcA 133-79 (1981).
44. Helen H. Hyun, Invisibility and Overrepresentation: Affirmative Action and
the Asian American Paradox, 6 AsxAN AM. POL'Y REV. 71 (1996).
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state-mandated discrimination based on race, the same dis-
crimination that locked me and my family away in the
prison of injustice in [the internment camp at] Gila River,
Arizona.4
There is no room in the black-white paradigm for a race that has
been the victim of historical discrimination and yet is the victim
of race-preference policies supposedly meant to remedy that dis-
crimination. Because it cannot accommodate the Asian-Ameri-
can experience, both yesterday and today, the black-white
paradigm, and the race-preference schemes based on it, must be
discarded.
The historical discrimination argument is also flawed in ways
other than failing to take into account the Asian-American expe-
rience. For instance, while the Supreme Court in Wygant 46 and
Croson 4" did say that remedying past discrimination may be a
compelling state interest that would satisfy the strict scrutiny test,
the Court also emphasized the narrowness of this application.48
According to the Court in Wygant, there must be "some showing
of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before
allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy
such discrimination."49 In other words, California advocates of
race preferences must demonstrate that the University of Califor-
nia system (with regard to undergraduate admissions) and the
specific UC graduate schools (with regard to graduate admis-
sions) have been guilty of documented discrimination against
under-represented minorities in the relatively recent past, and
that the impact of such discrimination still lingers and affects
current circumstances. 50
California advocates of race preferences are thus in the same
position as the University of Texas in the Hopwood case.5' In that
case, the University of Texas Law School argued that the state's
45. Nao Takasugi, statement to the University of California Board of
Regents, July 20, 1995.
46. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (involving a
school board's race-preference plan regarding teacher layoffs).
47. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (involving a city
plan to award 30% of its contracting work to minority-owned businesses).
48. A governmental actor may only classify individuals based on race
where there is a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary." Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
49. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
50. The "present effects of past discrimination" test is outlined in
Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) and Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
51. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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past history of discrimination in education should be viewed as a
compelling reason for allowing the law school to use a race-pref-
erence admissions program. The court of appeals, however,
pointed out that under the compelling state-interest test in
Wygant the appropriate unit of analysis was not the entire Texas
public education system, but the law school itself. And because
there was no evidence of discrimination in law school admissions
in the recent past, historical discrimination in the state's educa-
tion system could not justify the present consideration of race in
law school admissions.5 2 Since there is a similar lack of evidence
of discrimination against under-represented minorities at Cali-
fornia's public higher education institutions, there can be no
compelling state interest in having race-preferential admissions
programs.
Further, the "lingering effects" argument suffers from the
inherent problem of determining what is "lingering." In Podber-
esky v. Kirwan,5" which involved a race-preferential scholarship
program, the defendant university argued that its long-ended
practice of not admitting African Americans and the generally
hostile atmosphere perceived by African Americans on campus
were sufficient reasons for the program. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, accurately noted:
[M] ere knowledge of historical fact is not the kind of pres-
ent effect that can justify a race-exclusive remedy. If it were
otherwise, as long as there are people who have access to
history books, there will be programs such as this.'
The problem with using historical discrimination as ajustifi-
cation for race-preference programs is perhaps best summed up
by Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurring opinion in Adarandk
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial dis-
crimination should be made whole; but under our Consti-
tution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or
52. Id. at 954. The Fifth Circuit observed that racial tension at the
University of Texas Law School could not be used as a reason for race
preferences because that tension "is contributed to, rather than alleviated by,
the overt and prevalent consideration of race in admissions." Id. at 953. It
should be noted that the University of Texas Law School did practice de jure
discrimination against African Americans until 1950. However, the US.
Supreme Court struck down the law school's discriminatory practices in Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
53. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
54. Id. at 154.
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debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution's
focus upon the individual.55
In their history, Asian Americans have suffered discrimination,
yet are now treated as a race that owes something to under-repre-
sented minority groups. Of all people, then, Asian Americans
should welcome the opportunity to be treated simply as individu-
als protected by the rights and guarantees of the Constitution.
AsiAN AMEmCANS IN PUBLIC EMPLOyMENT
According to exit polls, Asian Americans supported Califor-
nia's Proposition 209 (the anti-race-preference California Civil
Rights Initiative) in greater numbers than any other minority
group.' Much of that support was likely due to the adverse
impact that race-based university admissions has had on Asian-
American applicants.
Supporters of race preferences within the Asian-American
community have attempted to focus attention not on public edu-
cation, but on public employment and public contracting. For
example, attorneys for the Asian Pacific American Legal Center
have claimed that race preferences are needed to overcome the
racial disparity within the Los Angeles Police Department (4.6%
of LAPD's personnel are Asian American, while 10% of the city's
population is Asian American)."'
The problem with such arguments is that the numbers put
forward to support the position of race-preference proponents
fail to take into account the choices made by Asian-Americans in
the job market. Relatively low Asian-American representation in
the LAPD may be a function of the historically low level of Asian-
American applicants to the LAPD rather than any conscious hir-
ing discrimination by the department. Much of the growth in
the Asian-American population in California has taken place just
over the last decade and a half. It is unrealistic to expect that
Asian-American representation in the LAPD would have risen
congruently with the rise in the Asian-American population in
general. Many new Asian immigrants are suspicious of the police
as a result of the corruption and heavy-handedness of police
55. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
56. Proposition 209 was supported by 39% of Asian-American voters,
while only 26% of African-American voters and 24% of Hispanic voters
supported the initiative. See State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1996.
57. Bonnie Tong et al., Asian Americans Wil Not Become a Wedge Group, LA.
TIMEs, May 31, 1996, at B9.
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agencies in the immigrants' home countries. In many cases,
police in the U.S. have a difficult enough time getting new Asian-
American immigrants to talk to officers (even when they have
been victimized by crime), let alone convince them to apply to
the police academy. Thus, historically, Asian-American parents
have urged their children to find careers in the professions or in
business, with few encouraging their offspring to go into police
work. In other words, Asian Americans simply may have exer-
cised their freedom to choose careers in areas other than law
enforcement.
An analogy can be made to women in the job marketplace.
It is often argued by proponents of gender preferences that such
preferences are needed because of the supposed "glass ceiling"
that women face in getting into upper management at large cor-
porations. Yet, the "glass ceiling" is a myth. One of the main
reasons for the relatively low number of women corporate CEO's
is that the pool of women qualified for those positions has histor-
ically been low. In 1960, women received only 19% of bachelor's
degrees.5" Thus, currently relatively few women are of the right
age and hold the right credentials to hold a top level corporate
position. As one study noted:
A typical corporate career lasts 40 to 45 years, which spans
two generations. The people who run today's largest cor-
porations were in their twenties in the 1960s. But ... the
National Longitudinal Survey shows that, as late as the
1960s, only 30% of women expected to be working at age
35. Since most women didn't expect even to be working at
35, it is doubtful that many of them prepared to be CEO's
at 55.
The available pool of qualified women is increasing signifi-
cantly. By 1995, 55% of bachelor's degrees went to women. 6 °
The percentage of MBA's earned by women increased from 3.6%
in 1970 to 35.6% in 1993.61 However, it is still important to note
that by 1990, while nearly one in four men holding a bachelor's
or advanced degree had earned that degree in business manage-
ment, fewer than one in eight women who held a bachelor's or
advanced degree had earned that degree in business manage-
ment. The concentration of women's degrees has been in educa-
58. Sally C. Pipes & Michael Lynch, Smart Women, Foolish Quotas, POL'Y
REV., July/Aug. 1996, at 32.
59. Michael Lynch & Katherine Post, What Glass Ceilingt, PuB. INTREsT,
Summer 1996, at 33.
60. Pipes & Lynch, supra note 58, at 32.
61. Lynch & Post, supra note 59, at 34.
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ion (one in four bachelor's or advanced degrees).62 Thus, while
women will likely increase their numbers in corporate senior
management, those numbers will still lag behind men, not
because of discrimination, but because women are voluntarily
choosing a non-business career.63
Similarly, the historic paucity of Asian-American applicants
to the LAPD and other law enforcement agencies may turn
around over time as Asian Americans become more assimilated
and begin to look at police work more favorably as a career
choice. For example, according to Los Angeles city personnel
statistics, from July 1995 to June 1996, the LAPD had 10,065
applicants. Of these, 900, or 8.9%, were Asian Americans. Dur-
ing this same period, the LAPD hired 118 Asian Americans, or
9.4% of the total number of hirees (a figure that was more than
double the current 4.6% Asian-American representation in the
LAPD)." In other words, over time, Asian Americans will likely
increase their numbers significantly in the LAPD, but only
because Asian Americans will be making the voluntary choice to
become police officers. Once again, race-preferential hiring is
not needed.
PUBLIC CONTRACTING
The area upon which Asian-American supporters of race
preferences prefer to focus is public contracting. In contrast to
their treatment in university admissions, Asian Americans are
often included as an under-represented minority entitled to spe-
cial preference in the awarding of such contracts because of their
62. Id. at 29-30.
63. Women also make free choices about other quality of life issues. For
example, research has borne out the common-sense notion that there is a
strong connection between job seniority (years spent working) and wage levels.
Other things being constant, ten years of job seniority raises the wage of the
typical worker by over 25%. In view of such findings, it naturally follows that
because women spend on average less time in the work force (according to a
1984 Census study, men spent only 1.6% of their work years away from work,
while women spent 14.7% of their work years away from work) they end up with
less job seniority and lower wages. The reason women spend more time away
from work often involves their free choice to spend more time with their
children, especially when the children are very young. It is this free choice of
life-options, rather than systematic gender-based wage discrimination, that
explains much of the aggregate wage gap that exists between women and men.
Indeed, separate research studies by Thomas Sowell and June O'Neill found
that women in their thirties without children who worked continuously either
earned slightly higher or nearly the same income as men. See Lynch & Post,
supra note 59, at 31-32.
64. Statistics quoted to author by Gail Thomas, Los Angeles city
personnel officer.
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low historical participation in the government contracts market.
In the federal program that was challenged in the Adarand case,
the Department of Transportation (DOT) required a certain
amount of public contracts be awarded to "small business con-
cerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disad-
vantaged individuals."'5 The DOT used the Small Business
Administration's definition of "socially and economically disad-
vantaged individual," which includes Asian Pacific Islanders (e.g.,
Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, etc.), in addition to
African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and
miscellaneous others.'
Again, however, regardless of whether Asian Americans are
advantaged or disadvantaged by a race-preference program, a
racial preference program must be judged by its adherence to
constitutional requirements. Equal protection analysis cares only
that individuals, of whatever race, are spared injury by govern-
mental race-classification schemes. Asian Americans may be
among those injured or they may not, but as long as there are
any individuals of any race injured by such a program there is a
likely violation of equal protection of the law.
Thus, when race-preference advocates speculate about
Asian-American businesses being generally shut out of the public-
contract market because of past discrimination, such a broad
accusation is irrelevant for constitutional analysis. As discussed
above,67 any charge of past discrimination must be made against
a specific government actor and program, and must involve tan-
gible lingering effects from this past discrimination. General
statements about historical wrongs are constitutionally irrelevant
as the majority opinion in Croson emphasized:
[A] generalized assertion that there has been past discrimi-
nation in an entire industry provides no guidance for a leg-
islative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it
seeks to remedy. It "has no logical stopping point."
"Relief" for such an ill-defined wrong could extend until
the percentage of public contracts awarded to [minority
businesses] in Richmond mirrored the percentage of
minorities in the population as a whole.68
65. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
1987 § 106(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1997).
66. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(b)(1) (1994).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
68. Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (quoting
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986)).
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Yet, as Asian-American race-preference advocates in the LAPD
case would openly admit, their goal is to ensure that such relief is
ongoing precisely to force Asian-American percentages either in
public employment or in public contracting to mirror Asian-
American percentages in the general population. Obviously,
that is a prospect that the Court views as clearly wrong.
Unless Asian Americans can meet the compelling state inter-
est requirements under the Adarand strict scrutiny test, they have
no reason, except blatant self-interest, to insist upon race prefer-
ences in public contracting. Asian Americans cannot have it
both ways. If they accept equal protection analysis when it helps
them (as it does in the university admissions area), then they
must also accept it when it seems to deny some Asian-American
businesses an unfair advantage in public contracting. UC Regent
Stephen Nakashima, in explaining his vote to eliminate race
preferences in UC's hiring and contracting practices, said:
[T]he decision to terminate the discriminatory preference
accorded to "minority" persons in hiring and contracting
resulted from an increasing awareness, prompted by deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court such as the
Adarand case, that discrimination should not beget discrim-
ination. Discrimination in any form inflicts unjust injury
upon its victims; the injury is no less because the person
who, or the institution which, inflicts it purports to act with
good intentions.69
In the end, Asian Americans would benefit most by living in a
world which offers equal protection for all rather than race pref-
erences for some.
CONCLUSION
The experiences of Asian Americans with race preferences
are important because they serve to illuminate the intellectual
contradictions and political shortcomings of race-preference the-
ory. Empirical evidence demonstrates that Asian Americans are
clearly hurt by race-preference policies (at least in the university
admissions area)."' This injury is especially galling because in
many cases Asian Americans are both more qualified (based on
objective indicators) and more socio-economically disadvantaged
than so-called under-represented minorities."1 Further, this
injury has been dealt to Asian Americans by government officials
despite the fact that Asian Americans have suffered undeniable
69. Nakashima, supra note 7, at 3.
70. Lynch, supra note 14, at 16.
71. Id. at 16.
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historical discrimination (the supposed reason for race-prefer-
ence policies). Thus, rather than put their faith in the quixotic
benevolence of government bureaucrats, Asian Americans would
do better to put their faith in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments which set forth the principle of equal protection. Cases
such as Wygant, Croson, Adarand, Hopwood, and Podberesky, there-
fore, should be viewed by the Asian-American community as
good news.
In the areas of public employment and public contracting,
Asian Americans must resist the temptation to have it both ways.
The long-run benefit of constitutional equal protection (being
judged on one's merits, hard work and excellence reaping their
just reward, etc.) should dwarf any short-term gains from govern-
ment-sponsored racial spoils programs.
In the end, Asian Americans would do well to heed the wise
words of Justice Scalia, who ended his concurring opinion in
Adarand with a call for racial unity under a common national
identity:
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the
most admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce
and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In
the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American. 72
Implementing Justice Scalia's vision would do more to advance
the lives of Asian Americans (and, for that matter, Americans of
all races) than any race-preference program could ever do.
72. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
